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Abstract: In this paper we use two computable general equilibrium models to evaluate gains of liberalization of trade 
in services for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. We employ two CGE models for the calculations. For the Argentine 
and Uruguayan cases, we apply a model built by the authors (see Chisari (2009)) based on the MPSGE. For Brazil, 
our study uses the GTAP model – adapted by Rutherford (2005) that also works on an MPSGE platform. We also 
consider two basic cases of liberalization of trade in services: 1) mobility of goods, in which there is mobility of 
services across borders, as it is the traditional case of exports and imports of goods, and 2) trade presence, that is 
location in the domestic country of new operators with a new technology for producing services.  
We estimate the gains from improvements in efficiency, quality and productivity of the industries of services, due to 
more intense competition in the domestic market as well as from reductions in the implicit mark up on domestic 
services due to barriers to trade. Quality advancements lead to gains in welfare of a similar order, or even higher than 
expected in the case of productivity improvements. To address the case of trade presence, a latent technology is 
defined in situ, operative or not depending on relative prices (its market share in the overall equilibrium of the 
economy is endogenous). This is especially relevant for the case of telecommunications. We also observe that: 1) the 
economy’s specific endowment of factors will limit the expected gains of the liberalization if the latent technology is 
unsuitable or incompatible with them, 2) governments can face some dilemmas regarding domestic market 
regulations, if the liberalization of trade in financial services called for a change in regulations so that the domestic 
demand for government bonds were to fall.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we use two computable general equilibrium models to evaluate gains of 
liberalization of trade in services for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. We replicate the economies 
of those economies and simulate several scenarios following other countries´ experience and 
suggestions of the literature.  
As a guide for policy, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are a very useful tool for ex 
ante experimentation. They place the discussion within a frame that is neither entirely normative 
nor completely positive, but intermediate, and make it possible to take into account the structural 
differences between the economies. Not only they can show what industries contract or expand, 
they also give some hints on the political economy of a trade reform.  
We estimate the gains derived from improvements in efficiency, quality and productivity of the 
industries of services, due to more intense competition in the domestic market. One interesting 
result is that quality advancements lead to gains in welfare of a similar order or even higher than 
the expected in the case of productivity improvements. Additionally, we estimate the gains 
obtained from a reduction in the implicit mark up of domestic services due to barriers to trade. 
 We consider two basic cases of liberalization of trade in services: 1) mobility of goods, in which 
there is mobility of services across borders, as it is the traditional case of exports and imports of 
goods, and 2) trade presence, that is location in the domestic country of new operators with a new 
technology for producing services.  
To address the second case, a latent technology is defined in situ, ant it will be operative or not 
depending on relative prices. Thus,  two technologies will be competing within the same industry 
and market forces will determine, at the end of the day, their market share in the overall 
equilibrium of the economy. This is specially relevant for the case of telecommunications. 
We see that the economy’s specific endowment of factors will limit the expected gains of the 
liberalization if the latent technology is unsuitable or incompatible with them. For example, if 
trade presence intensively uses human capital that is unavailable in the economy, the welfare 
improvements will be less than expected, or will only be possible when the supply of human 
capital will respond to the new requirements. 
We will also see that governments can face some dilemmas regarding domestic market 
regulations. If the liberalization of trade in financial services called for a change in regulations so 
that the domestic demand for government bonds were to fall, the long-term gains could be 
overshadowed by the immediate costs. This could occur, for example, if greater trade presence 
had to be accompanied with less strict regulations on (issued by the government) bonds holdings. 
Hence, the so called “home bias”, real or induced by financial regulations, could have to be lower 
after liberalization. 
The results of the computational exercises are presented as changes in: 1) welfare of households 
(measured in terms of the equivalent variation), for example associated with the breakdown of 
restrictions (whose magnitude includes estimations from other papers, cf. Berlinski (2008) and 
Dee (2004 and 2005)), 2) rates of profit and the activity levels of industries, 3) prices of goods 
and factors2, and 4) macroeconomic indicators, like the fiscal net result and the trade balance, to 
                                               
2 Note that said results refer to annual magnitudes. 
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assess the feasibility of reforms. We try to identify the dilemmas and contradictions that the 
liberalization of trade in services could pose to the economies with respect to the trade surplus, 
income distribution and the fiscal situation, as well as to illustrate them quantitatively to 
understand their magnitude and relevance.  
We employ two CGE models for the calculations. For the Argentine and Uruguayan cases, we 
apply a model built by the authors (see Chisari (2009)) based on the MPSGE (see, for example, 
Rutherford and Paltsev (2000)). This kind of model allows for a greater degree of flexibility to 
design the simulations. For Brazil, our study uses the GTAP model – adapted by Rutherford 
(2005) that also works on an MPSGE platform.  
The following section presents a brief review of the literature. This helps to identify some of the 
exercises that must be considered to place our work within the context of the current discussion. 
Then, the next section develops a simplified version of the economic model. In this frame we 
highlight the simulation exercises inspired in the literature and those we built derived from our 
own analysis based on the structural characteristics of the countries. This reveals how relevant 
some macroeconomic dilemmas are (such as the way government bonds affect prices given 
greater financial liberalization) or the development of new industrial organizations in sectors with 
highly-intensive technology use (for example, when allowing for the trade presence of entrant 
suppliers of telecommunications). Following that, we classify the main simulations, briefly 
describing their isolated treatment or among themselves. The following sections analyze the 
results for Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. The paper closes with some lessons and key 
conclusions. The paper also includes an appendix that describes the model for Argentina and 
Uruguay. The model for Brazil is the GTAP version.  
2 THE LITERATURE ON THE LIBERALIZATION OF SERVICES IN A COMPUTABLE 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
Dee’s (2003) discusses the special characteristics that models applied to trade in services must 
take into account and summarizes some methods to quantify the barriers to trade in services. It 
mentions that the services are often tailored to the buyers and that this has to do with the regional 
characteristics of the demand or the regulatory framework in which they operate. It also discusses 
the mobility of production factors starting from capital mobility when barriers to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) have been eliminated.  
Markusen Rutherford and Tarr (1999) model FDI stressing the intensive use of skilled labor. 
Lejour and Rojas-Romagosa (2006) give an overview of the literature on FDI modeling in a 
general equilibrium. Konan and Maskus (2006) present a model of this kind for the case of 
Tunisia, a country where the elimination of restrictions on trade in services would have more 
impact than the liberalization of trade in goods.  
Rutherford, Tarr and Shepotylo (2005), within a similar context, incorporate the impact of 
income distribution and of the liberalization of FDI, indicating that the key component of welfare 
gains (in Russia) is associated, as in Konan and Maskus (2006), with the elimination of the 
restrictions on FDI in services. To that end, they model the elimination of the implicit mark-up in 
the prices of services while also considering that the productivity changes endogenously via a 
Dixit-Stiglitz structure, which implies some substitution between the business services and the 
production factors. 
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Markusen and Strand (2006) sustain that the increase in the trade in services results from  
technological change, basically in telecommunications, which allows for gains in the spatial 
fragmentation of the activities. The results of their model show gains for small countries with 
skilled labor that can export services to larger and more developed countries. 
Balistreri, Rutherford and Tarr (2007) employ a Dixit-Stiglitz structure (of variety of goods) for 
business services so as to model endogenous productivity gains through the introduction of new 
varieties (that would grant entry to a higher number of suppliers). The authors model the 
liberalization of barriers to the trade in services both for domestic and foreign goods. 
A crucial element in many of the models cited is the estimations of equivalents ad valorem of the 
barriers to the trade in services. Table 1 presents the estimations used in several of the above-
mentioned papers3. 
Table 1: Trade in services. Ad valorem equivalent barriers utilized in literature 
(%) 
FDI bariers 
Type 1 
barriers: 
Border 
trade 
Type 3 
barriers: 
Foreign 
presence 
Domestic 
firms 
Mark up 
Multinationa 
production 
Mark up Sector 
Rutherford, Tarr, 
Shepotylo (2005) Konan and Maskus (2006) 
Balistreri, Ruthelford, 
Tarr (2007) 
Telecoms 33 200 30 12 25 
Insurance s.d 50 50 s.d s.d 
Financial Services  36 30 30 8 17 
Transport 53 50 3 42 57 
Source: Own elaboration. 
       
Many of them utilize MPSGE, often contained in a GAMS environment, for their experiments. 
Overall, the MPSGE is a Walrasian-type structure that self-calibrates. That is, it has the 
advantage of reducing the cost of programming the calibration every time one wishes to make a 
slight change in the model, something that is necessary when working with GAMS. GAMS is an 
optimization program, which can be adapted to maximize a neutral objective function that is 
subject to the constitutive equations of the general equilibrium model. However, not all of the 
Walrasian or general equilibrium structures can be reduced to optimization models. The 
complementary approach allows us to tackle such cases (for example, minimum wages). 
Nonetheless, we can work simultaneously with the two, thus taking advantage of both. Such is 
the strategy that we followed in our model. 
Whalley (2004) downplays the conclusions of the quantitative studies, arguing that they do not 
consider the heterogeneity of the services activities. He focuses on the barriers to trade in services 
in the countries and on interpreting the quantitative findings generated by the models, and 
recognizes that the credibility of the estimations obtained in CGE models depends on the validity 
of the assumptions and the availability of the data, as well as that the precision of the estimations 
can challenge the importance of the computed gains in welfare. However, he claims that the 
                                               
3 We have based our estimates of ad valorem equivalents for constrains in Berlinski et al (2008) analysis. 
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possibility of conducting this exercise has the benefit of the information obtained and the 
externality of generating a demand for data that can improve future estimations. 
3 THE BASIC  ECONOMIC MODEL.  
To present the counterfactual exercises we sum up the causal elements in the CGE model in this 
section. This is a simplified model with a reduced dimension. We also leave aside some markets, 
as well as unemployment. Appendix A describes the models for the Argentine, Uruguayan and 
Brazilian cases in greater detail.  
For now, let us consider an economy with only one domestic agent, whose utility function 
depends on domestic goods c, services a, imported goods m and bonds held by households bF: 
u(c,a,m,bF). The equations correspond to the usual optimal conditions, which equal the marginal 
substitution rate to relative prices given by the quotient between the price of domestic goods in 
international terms p* and the prices of imported goods p*m: 
[1] *m
*
mc p /pu  / u  . 
a
*
ac p /pu  / u   
b
*
bc p /pu  / u   
Superscript F indicates the variables corresponding to households. The following equation is the 
budget constraint of the domestic agent. w represents wages, L0 is the endowment of labor, and π 
and πa are benefits in the industries producing goods and services, respectively. The parameters η 
and θ represent the participation of domestic agents in each (0 < η , θ < 1). To simplify, we also 
assume that the participation in capital ownership coincides with the latter two (the rest of the 
world retains the complementary shares).  
[2] F0ba
 0F
ba
*
m
 * bprKL  wbpap   m p  c p)t1(   . 
Equation [2] assumes that the consumer only pays taxes on the purchase of domestic tradable 
goods. This is a simplification given that the model includes all of the taxes in the economy. The 
last term reflects the initial bonds held by the household. 
The production of domestic goods c and exports x in terms of capital and employment is given 
by: 
[3]  KL, F  c  x  . 
The benefits of the tradable industry are: 
[4]   d a** ap - K r - L  w- cxp   
where r* indicates capital remuneration and pa ad  are expenditures on services, which are 
assumed in fixed coefficients with the total aggregate value:  
[5]  K L, F   a d  . 
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The maximization conditions of benefits are:4 
[6]    0r F p  - p * Ka*  , 
[7]   0  wF p  - p La*  , 
when the levels of capital use and labor are determined optimally. At the level of the services 
industry, the corresponding equations to define benefits, optimal conditions, and the output 
function are: 
[8]     *aaaa a p LG L w- LG  p   , 
[9]  as LG   a  , 
[10] *( ) ( ) 0.a ap p G L w      
The last term represents the use of tradable goods in the services sector (in fixed coefficients 
given by θ) . We also assume that the sector only employs labor to produce services. Once again, 
this is a simplification in this reduced version.  
The government has a budget constraint given by: 
G
b
G G
0b
 * bpL  wbp c tp  . 
The left side represents tax and bonds sales. The right side represents the purchases of labor and 
bonds (so that there is a net position in bonds). Notice that here we assume that the government is 
not participating actively in the markets for goods or services, although that does not occur in the 
general model. Here the government collects taxes and mainly use the proceedings to hire 
workers and repay debt.  
We also include familiar equilibrium conditions in the labor market, in the services market, and 
in the bonds market:  
[11] 0Ga L L L  L  , 
[12] 0 a -a a  sFd  . 
[13] 0b - b -b b F0
G
0
FG  . 
Note that in this version, the external sector does not buy domestic bonds, which is also a strong 
assumption that we leave aside in the general model.  Given these assumptions, we can obtain an 
equilibrium in the following current account as:  
[14] * *    (1  )   (1- ) (1- )x m ap x p m r K         . 
In the above equations we also hypothesize that neither imports nor exports exist of services 
which might result from trade barriers or transportation costs, or both.  
Once found an equilibrium, we conduct several counterfactual computational exercises:  
                                               
4 We assume that the degree of homogeneity of F and G is less than one.  
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Exercise 1: Elimination of barriers on the import of services. To explore the impact of 
eliminating barriers or lowing costs, we take barriers as the equivalent to mark-ups λ on the 
international prices of services s*. In addition, we define transportation costs as a percentage of 
the international price as c. Therefore, there is no trade (of imports) because: pa  <  s* (1 + λ + 
c). 
Some models in the literature assume that β and α are functions of λ, that is, that a greater 
liberalization of trade in services stimulates their productivity (β is greater if λ is smaller) and 
improves its quality (α is lower if λ is lower). However, objections also exist in the literature as to 
how far trade can be liberalized and its impact on λ as small domestic suppliers of these services 
could be replaced by larger foreign firms, with stronger market power to make λ rise. 
The positive effects of greater trade would thus be conditioned by the degree of competitiveness 
ex post. A reduction in λ owing to the new trade policy would increase the purchase of services to 
be used as intermediate inputs. Since the observed share of low income deciles in the capital of 
firms is small, for the sake of simplification our explorations consider that the excess mark-up is 
entirely absorbed by the richest decile in the domestic economy, by the rest of the world, or by 
the government (the last only being the case for Uruguay). 
An increase in λ could occur if the liberalization were to create imperfect domestic competition. 
This could imply that an increase in productivity is associated with a loss vis-à-vis the allocation 
of resources. Most of the literature assumes that the liberalization of the trade in services would 
generate a competitive market structure. In contrast, Konan and Van Assche (2006) model the 
liberalization of telecommunications in Tunisia under the assumption that there will be one sole 
entrant. So, they define alternative counterfactual scenarios simulating: (i) that the installed firm 
and the entrant compete á la Cournot or establish a Cartel, (ii) that the firms confront identical 
costs or alternative costs that differ from the two firms, and (iii) that the entrant could export 
remittances of gains or maintain them in the country where the investment is being made. Chisari 
et al. (2003) have already explored this last aspect for the case of regulated public services, 
showing the choice of alternative regulation mechanisms that influence the performance of the 
trade balance.  
Note that we should take into account the change in condition [14] as a consequence of the 
liberalization. In the case of the above reduced model we can say: 
[15]  )-(1 K )r 1(*a*s m p  xp **m
x  .  
In this equation a* represents the net imports of services, while s* is the international price. An 
increase in imports will have to be covered by a higher amount of exports, that is, it will have to 
boost the export effort that the economy will have to make, even though cheaper or better 
services will become available. The net effect depends on parameter values and should be 
examined in a general equilibrium. 
Exercise 2: Elimination of barriers on the export of services. As in Case 1, the exports of 
services from Argentina may be subject to a mark-up factor or additional costs that are collected 
by the rest of the world. Let us call pa* the international price. So, domestic producers would see 
a price pa*(1-λ*) where λ* is the mark-up of the rest of the world prior to liberalization. An 
international negotiation could mean simultaneously eliminating λ  and  λ*. This would be an 
expected positive effect of the opening, most probably based on expectations of reciprocity. 
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Exercise 3: Gains from improvement in quality, productivity, and efficiency. The effect on 
welfare of reducing α is a gain in the quality of domestic services, which help the rest of the 
industries reduce their expenses in services per unit of aggregate value. This effect is similar to a 
positive externality of one output sector over the rest of the output sectors. For example, 
insurance services could become more agile and the transaction costs or the judicial costs from 
controversies could drop. On the other hand, increasing β corresponds to higher productivity 
owing to a higher level of competition. This is equivalent to a rise in the total productivity of 
factors in the services sector, which, following the improvement produces more units with the 
same endowment of labor (and capital in the general model). Efficiency gains mean that the 
services sector employs fewer intermediate inputs to produce one output unit, thus freeing 
resources that can be absorbed of by the rest of the economy. Equation [8] captures this effect via 
a reduction in θ. 
Exercise 4: Trade presence and technology adoption. In this case trade liberalization leads to 
the entry of new firms with new technology. These entrants contest the incumbents’ market 
share. Therefore, incumbents will see a reduction in the reward of their specific capital. To take 
into account competition between both kinds of firms it is necessary to modify equation [9] to 
account for a new supplier and the associated equations. For example, the new output of services 
will be given as:   )Ke(HLG   a as   , where Ke is the international mobile capital used in the 
new competitor’s output, whose output is given by function H. It would also be necessary to 
consider the new payment of dividends in equation [14]. It is possible to study two sub-cases of 
this scenario. In one of them the technology of entrants is the same as that employed by 
incumbents with the only difference that domestic specific capital is replaced with international 
mobile capital (though the rest of the parameters remain the same). This sub case is identified 
with –T in the simulations that follow below. In Chisari et al (2008) we also studied an additional 
case, in which we assume that the entrant’s technology is the same as that used in the US. This is 
not presented here. 
 Exercise 5: Changes in the preferences for domestic bonds after liberalizing the financial 
sector.  Trade presence in financial institutions may make it necessary to modify the regulatory 
policy of investment (especially the requirements to purchase domestic bonds that are often 
imposed on financial institutions). In this case the utility function should be modified, for 
example, as u(c,a,m,εbF). And the third first-order condition listed in [1] could now be written as 
b
*
bc p /pu  / u  . This change in preference will impact on the prices of domestic bonds and 
could explain the reluctance of some governments to reform trade of financial services. 
 Exercise 6: Modifications in the intensity of factor use due to trade presence or the need to 
compete. Opening the economy, in particular trade presence, may make it necessary to increase 
the intensity in the use of scarce factors, like human capital, to supply industries using foreign 
technology. Some economies may find it difficult to improve the supply of factors quickly, 
resulting in limited short-term gains. However, this can be seen when different technologies are 
put to compete as was mentioned for Case 4 above; changes in relative prices in favor of scarce 
factors would put a natural limit to entry. 
The above exercises are subject to sensitivity evaluations to examine the changes in the results 
owing to:  
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 Modifications in the elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported services, 
and in the degree of labor and capital mobility between industries (even between services 
and the rest of the world).  
 Different kinds of labor with different degrees of mobility between industries. A 
reduction in the mark-up of the rest of the world (barriers) on exports of domestic 
services.  
4 THE NATURE OF LIBERALIZATION EXERCISES IN THE TRADE IN SERVICES   
The model used in this paper for Argentina and Uruguay is an updated and expanded version of 
the model built by Chisari et al. (2009) for Argentina, 2004. It has 29 output sectors, which use 
labor and specific capital in their value added functions (Cobb-Douglas so that these simulations 
are neutral and guarantee a solution). Intermediate inputs are used in fixed coefficients among 
themselves and with value added. Each sector is divided into three sub-sectors to capture the 
differences in tax treatment (especially VAT) for each destination (domestic market, exports and 
investment). There are ten income deciles, each having a utility function (Cobb-Douglas), a 
government sector and the rest of the world. The model includes unemployment given the 
characteristics of the Argentine and Uruguayan economies. We assume a constant real wage for 
the simulations. Unemployment is not considered for Brazil, since we use for that economy a 
version of GTAP. 
The two services under analysis – Telecommunications and Financial and Insurance Services –  
have a key participation in Argentina’s GDP (2.6% and 4.3%, respectively). Table 2 presents data 
on the production structure, the factoral structure, the input-output relations and the sales 
structure of these services.  
Table 1: Argentina, Brazil y Uruguay. Composition of costs and destination of sales. (% of 
sectoral VBP) 
Argentina -2004- Uruguay -2000- Brazil – 2001- 
Costs  Fin. Serv. 
and Ins. Telec. 
Fin. Serv. 
and Ins. Telec. 
Fin. Serv. 
and Ins. Telec. 
Raw Materials 35.0 48.6 15.5 27.2 41.9 27.9 
Value Added 65.0 51.4 84.5 72.8 58.1 72.1 
 - Employment 29.7 11.4 19.0 26.9 44.7 23.0 
 - Capital 35.3 40.0 65.5 46.0 13.4 49.1 
Sectoral Gross Sales 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Argentina -2004- Uruguay -2000- Brazil – 2001- 
Destination of Sales Fin. Serv. 
and Ins. Telec. 
Fin. Serv. 
and Ins. Telec. 
Fin. Serv. 
and Ins. Telec. 
Intermediate Sales 72.9 63.3 32.0 56.0 49.8 47.9 
Exports 0.0 2.8 2.6 4.9 1.2 3.1 
Final Consumption 27.1 33.9 65.4 39.1 49.0 49.0 
Sectoral Gross Sales 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own elaboration. 
As can be seen, for Argentina, Financial and Insurance Services (F&I) use proportionally more 
foreign intermediate inputs than Telecommunications and have a substantially greater 
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capital/labor ratio (3.5 vs. 1.2). On the demand side, the main destination for both services are 
intermediate sales. 
In the Uruguayan case, the data used in constructing the social accounting matrices as of the year 
2000 were based on Katz et al. (2004). Telecommunications and Financial and Insurance 
Services have a significant participation in Uruguay’s GDP (10.7% and 2.6%, respectively), and 
this will explain the relevance of exercises in that industry for the whole economy. We can see 
that Telecommunications buys proportionally more intermediate inputs than Financial Services. 
Instead, Financial Services have a considerably greater capital/employment relationship (3.5) 
than Telecommunications (1.7). On the demand side, the chief destination of financial services is 
final consumption, whereas Telecommunications targets intermediate sales. 
The data used in the case of Brazil are based on the social accounting matrices elaborated by 
GTAP as of 2001. The two services considered here (Telecommunications and Financial and 
Insurance Services) have a dissimilar participation in Brazil’s GDP (8.1% and 1.7%, 
respectively) according to the GTAP database. Table 1 shows that Financial Services buy 
proportionally more intermediate inputs than Telecommunications. Telecommunications has a 
substantially higher capital/labor proportion (2.1) than Financial Services (0.3). On the demand 
side, the key destinations of the two services are final consumption and intermediate sales are 
almost of identical proportions.  
5 COUNTERFACTUAL EXPERIMENTS 
To compute the results, we use two general equilibrium models. For the cases of Argentina and 
Uruguay, we employ a model built by Chisari et al. (2009) based on MPSGE by Rutherford 
(1995). This model offers a greater degree of flexibility to design the simulations. For Brazil, the 
study uses the GTAP model that Rutherford (2005) adapted to work on an MPSGE platform. 
The services included in these estimations are Telecommunications (TEL) and Financial and 
Insurance Services (F&I). We consider two types of shocks: quantity includes changes in 
productivity, efficiency, quality, and technology substitution. Price shocks correspond to 
modifications in the percentages of mark-up on prices associated with the reduction in trade 
barriers. Furthermore, we simulate the shocks of prices associated with the change in the 
equivalents ad valorem of the estimated restrictions using Dee (2005). Moreover, we study some 
cases that combine simulations, for example, decreases in mark-ups with the available technology 
compared with situations in which technology coexists with other new technology using different 
or proportionally different factors. Note that the models for Argentina and Uruguay include the 
bonds markets and the fixed real wage to calibrate the economy to that of the year of reference.5  
The living standards of the households are indicated by the income level – Poorest Household for 
lower income households and Wealthiest Household for the counterpart (where the former 
aggregates the first five deciles and the latter aggregates the remaining five deciles). The 
unemployment rate and government transfers have strong repercussions on the first, while the 
welfare of the second depends relatively more on capital remuneration. Both Argentina and 
                                               
5 Regarding the last one, we cannot overlook that productivity improvements in the economy could induce an 
increase in the real wage, which would have a negative effect on almost every indicator. 
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Uruguay evidence a set of transfers from the government to the households; so, the fiscal 
situation is reflected in their living standards.  
5.1 A taxonomy of the main simulations in this study 
As we mentioned, service industries studied in this paper are “Telecommunications” and 
“Financial and Insurance Services” (F&I), We use aNT  and aTN  to indicate the amount of said 
services inputs N purchased by tradable industries T and, similarly, the amount of tradable inputs 
purchased by the services industries. In line with the previous section, a reduction in the first 
coefficient will imply greater efficiency in the use of services inputs in the tradable industries. 
However, we will also interpret this as an improvement in the quality of the services. So, to 
obtain an effective unit of the corresponding service, it will be necessary to buy fewer units. Let 
us make an analogy with the agricultural sector to understand why. An improvement in quality  
of seeds will mean that a higher proportion of the “seed”-buying sectors will find themselves in 
better conditions to sow or produce flour. Likewise, more efficiency in the use of inputs by the 
services would be reflected in a reduction of the second coefficient. From both cases  we should 
expect welfare gains as resources will be freed that can potentially be used elsewhere in the 
economy.  
As was mentioned, some of the models in the literature assume that the expected changes in these 
technology coefficients are functions of λ, that is, that a greater liberalization of trade in services 
stimulates efficiency (aTN is lower if  λ  is lower) and improves its quality (aNT is lower if λ  is 
lower). As we also mentioned in Section II, some object to the idea that trade liberalization is 
condition enough to reduce λ. Small domestic suppliers of services could be replaced by other 
larger international firms with greater market power to raise λ. The beneficial effects of more 
trade would thus be conditioned by their ex-post level of efficiency and the ex-post structure of 
the industrial organization.   
Let us now consider the counterfactual exercises used in the models for Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay: 
 QUA. The Effect of reducing aNT on welfare. The decrease in this coefficient is 
similar to a gain in the quality of domestically produced services, which help the rest 
of the industries reduce their purchases of services per unit of aggregate value. We 
also evaluate the improvement in the quality of the service for customers, who, in 
turn, have to buy fewer units of the good to obtain an effective unit of the desired 
service. This savings are used to buy other goods in the economy. These exercises 
also include all of the industrial demand of the service under study; improvements in 
quality work as an externality and increase the rate of profit of industries. Since it is 
adopted by the service sector, but increases profits of the rest, it is difficult to find 
incentives to increase quality beyond the forces of competition within the service 
sector itself. It is assumed a 10 percent reduction in the necessary amount of the 
service to obtain a unit of output. 
 EFF. Welfare gains by decreasing aTN . This corresponds to an increase in 
productivity owing to greater efficiency We assume a 10-percent reduction in the 
demand for intermediate inputs by the services sectors considered in the analysis. A 
reduction in this coefficient frees resources to be used elsewhere in the economy. In 
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this case there are clear incentives to adopt more efficient techniques since they 
increase directly the rate of profit of the services industry. 
 PRO. Improvements in productivity. We consider increases in total factor 
productivity, understood as reductions in the necessary amount of value added to 
obtain a unit of output. We simulate productivity growth by increasing the output of 
the services under study by 10 percent without increasing the factor demand. As in the 
previous case, there are neat incentives for individual firms to adopt new techniques.  
 MUP. More intensive domestic competitive conditions. This is represented as a 
reduction in λ owing to the opening to the trade in services, which would lead to an 
increase in the purchases of foreign services to be used as intermediate inputs or for 
final demand (unless domestic prices were disciplined to fall in equal proportion). 
However, as we have mentioned, according to some international literature, trade 
opening could generate an increase in λ, rather than a decrease, should the 
liberalization create imperfect domestic competition. This would cause the smallest 
and most competitive firms to disappear after the opening and be replaced by other 
larger and more concentrated firms. This may imply that productivity growth is 
associated with a loss from the viewpoint of the allocation of resources. In general, we 
assume a 20-percent drop in the mark-up. 
 T1 and T2. Competition of technologies. We reconsider the previous simulations to 
take into account the possibility of competition of technologies due to the 
liberalization. That is, we admit presence of entrants to the domestic market. They use 
a new technology; basically it uses international mobile capital and is more efficient 
in the use of intermediate goods. In these cases, the model evaluates endogenously the 
welfare gains derived from allowing the two competing technologies to be operative 
simultaneously. Hence, we can determine the industrial organization ex post without 
assuming a mandatory substitution; the scale of operation of each technology will be 
determined by the market workings and as both industries produce the same good, 
competitive costs will explain their market share. Simulations of individual cases can be 
presented in associated ways. For example, the case MUP-T stand for mark up changes due to 
competition of technologies. 
 LIB and LIB-P. Financial liberalization and changes in regulation. An increase in 
the presence of international operators in the domestic financial  sector may call for a 
change in the norms and regulation of the portfolio composition, and more 
specifically, in the proportion of government bonds in total holdings. This is 
tantamount to a change in preferences for domestic bonds, which can (in the short 
term) offset the main gains resulting from improved quality and efficiency. These 
exercises are useful for understanding the immediate resistance to reforms that can 
ultimately generate gains in the long term. We indicate with LIB the case of 
liberalization of financial services, and with LIB-P the same case when regulations are 
adapted by the government (we assume that it is equivalent to a reduction of 5% in the 
price of bonds issued by the public sector). 
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5.2 Productivity (PRO), efficiency (EFF) and quality (QUA) gains due to 
liberalization. 
For Argentina, Table 3 shows a striking similarity in productivity and quality gains in terms of 
the domestic product and welfare. That is, a 10-percent rise in the total productivity of the factors 
is almost the equivalent to a 10-percent improvement in the quality of the services herein 
considered. This basically reflects the structural characteristics of the Argentine economy. We 
also obtain positive results from the 10-percent improvement in efficiency in the services sectors, 
although the magnitude is more moderate because this exercise is basically reflected in an 
increase in labor productivity and not in all of the factors. Note that the change in the trade 
surplus is not always positive and that the activity level of these services is lower than in the 
quality factor of (QUA) because of lower usage of these inputs in the rest of the economy. This is 
noticeable in the case of Telecommunications. As to the political economy, it is difficult to find 
sectors or households that have been negatively affected by these changes and that could have 
disputed the reform, taking into account that it also benefited the government.  
Table 1: Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Computable General Equilibrium Model simulations. 
Results corresponding to productivity, efficiency and quality changes (%)  
Argentina Uruguay Brazil  
Indicators PRO EFF QUA PRO EFF QUA PRO EFF QUA 
Real GDP 0.94 0.76 1.13 3.18 0.70 1.60 1.18 0.57 1.09 
Real Investment 1.12 0.72 1.09 3.23 0.67 1.51 0.37 0.20 0.03 
Trade* (superavit) -1.09 -0.82 0.19 - - - - - - 
Trade* (deficit)  - - - 13.80 3.19 6.20 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
Activity level          
Agriculture 0.19 0.08 0.17 1.97 0.30 0.87 0.16 -0.06 0.43 
Industry 0.54 0.25 0.57 2.15 0.35 1.27 0.87 0.01 1.40 
Services  0.19 0.27 0.24 1.74 0.38 0.87 -0.23 0.03 2.26 
TEL Sector  6.83 0.00 -3.02 7.93 0.37 -2.69 6.09 0.70 2.16 
F&I Sector  5.52 -0.13 -4.75 10.16 0.11 -0.26 5.39 0.91 2.55 
Home Welfare - - - - - - 2.18 0.87 1.71 
Poorest Household  1.42 0.84 1.30 2.43 0.53 1.28 - -  
Wealthiest Household  0.90 0.65 0.95 3.38 0.67 1.49 - - - 
Government Fiscal Situation 0.67 0.40 0.91 1.51 0.35 0.90 0.67 0.09 4.39 
Source: Based on Chisari, Romero y Maquieyra (2008) results. PRO: 10 % productivity increase in services. EFF: 10 % 
efficiency increase in services. QUA: 10 % quality improvement in services. Same model is used for Argentina and Uruguay 
(Chisari et al (2006)) and GTAP for Brazil. * Note: Percentage changes refers to constant price variations, signs take initial 
calibration as reference (Superavit  for Argentina, deficit for Uruguay and Brazil) 
 
Uruguay is a different case. The impact of productivity improvement (Table 1) and its effects 
have had a greater magnitude than in Argentina because the Telecommunications and Financial 
Services activities represent about 12 percent of the economy’s GDP. In contrast, Argentina 
registered half as much. On the other hand, improvements in QUA do not match the productivity 
level. This implies that the gains derived from domestic improvements in the sectors are more 
relevant than their externalities, which we did not observe in the Argentine case. Note that, given 
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the relative importance of the selected activities, the deterioration in the trade balance is 
substantially higher than the similar effect seen in Argentina’s PRO and EFF. As to income 
distribution, the welfare of poor households continues to be linked to the adjustments in the 
public sector because of the set of transfers that characterize the economy. Among the sectors in 
the economy and except in the case of EFF, industry continues to benefit most from 
improvements. 
Table 3 also presents the findings of the model’s productivity simulations calibrated with the 
Brazilian data. We use a GTAP model with its own database. Unlike the Argentine and 
Uruguayan cases, this model assumes full employment and the financial transactions are less 
detailed. The gains in productivity, quality and efficiency (in that order) boost welfare and, as in 
the previous cases, household gains surpass the government’s gains, except in the simulations for 
Quality. The impact on the external sector, however, of these experiments is practically null. 
5.3 Productivity, efficiency and quality under competition of technologies and 
international mobility of capital.  
We re-examined the above simulations assuming that liberalization implies the domestic 
installation of a technology using mobile capital with respect to the rest of the world (PRO-T, 
EFF-T and QUA-T). To perform these simulations we assumed that new producers of services 
enter the economy, and that they produce perfect substitutes of domestic services. It is also 
assumed that they employ intermediate consumption and labor in the same proportion as the 
domestic industries, but that they replace domestic capital for international capital. This exercise 
tries to capture the possibility of capital mobility across both domestic sectors and the rest of the 
world. The industrial structure of TEL and F&I is determined endogenously with the solution of 
the model.  
The simulated improvements in productivity, quality and efficiency (Table 4)  are assumed to 
occur only in the new activities, and installed ones must adapt to the change. In general, this 
happens with a reduction in their participation in the market as a whole and with a decrease in the 
remuneration of the fixed factor (specific capital).  In general, the second effect dominates the 
first.  
In the Argentine case, the overall standard of living of the households rises once again, although 
this change is not as striking for the Richest Household because the ownership of specific capital 
is already concentrated there and it is specific capital that sees a reduction in its reward, due to a 
more intense competition. In the case of Quality, the welfare of the Richest Household shows 
greater changes than in the cases of  PRO-T and EFF-T.  
As mentioned, this exercise also shows how the industrial structure is altered in the services 
sector after a liberalization of this kind. However, the new industry does not generate a 
significant displacement of the existing one as the specific capital tends to absorb the decrease in 
the sector’s prices. In all our cases of technology substitution (for all countries), the share of 
entrants rises to a range of between 5 and 11 percent; again, the reason for the limited 
replacement is the fact that the reward of non-mobile capital of incumbents tends to absorb the 
differences in productivity, quality or efficiency. We should expect a progressive replacement, 
rather than a sudden change in the pattern of the industrial structure. The impact on the trade 
surplus is positive in PRO-T and negative in the other two cases. 
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In Uruguay, the positive effects on GDP and Investment are higher than in Argentina. We can see 
that PRO-T diminishes the trade deficit while the positive results of EFF-T and QUA-T are quite 
clear. Additionally, the effect for the Richest Household is higher than that for the Poorest 
Household in all three cases. As in the case of Argentina, the presence of the new technology 
reduces the welfare gains for all deciles. 
Table 2: Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay Computable General Equilibrium Model simulations. Results 
corresponding to technological substitution and its effects on productivity, efficiency and quality changes 
(%)  
Argentina Uruguay Brazil 
Indicators 
PRO-T EFF-T QUA-T PRO-T 
EFF-
T 
QUA-
T 
PRO 
(a1) 
PRO 
(a2) 
PRO 
(skl) 
Real GDP 0.48 0.74 1.06 2.38 0.78 1.35 1.15 1.12 1.16 
Real Investment 0.24 0.73 1.09 1.60 0.73 1.36 0.35 0.33 0.38 
Trade* (Superavit) 2.32 -1.13 -0.39 - - - - - - 
Trade*(Deficit) - - - -6.52 2.94 7.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Activity level                   
Agriculture 0.13 0.07 0.15 2.17 0.38 0.64 0.18 0.20 0.14 
Industry 0.37 0.22 0.51 2.34 0.43 1.03 0.91 0.95 0.83 
Services  -0.24 0.29 0.27 0.57 0.40 0.82 -0.24 -0.25 -0.22 
TEL Sector  1.86 0.07 -2.57 3.98 0.12 -2.19 6.03 5.98 6.12 
F&I Sector  1.86 0.13 -4.12 6.81 0.06 -0.06 5.25 5.08 5.46 
Home Welfare - - - - - - 2.17 2.16 2.16 
Poorest Household  0.60 0.84 1.23 1.10 0.57 1.18 -  -  -  
Wealthiest Household  0.13 0.66 0.95 1.66 0.73 1.34 -   -  - 
Government Fiscal Situation  0.38 0.85 1.02 0.39 0.80 0.67 0.68 0.70 
Source: Based on Chisari, Romero y Maquieyra (2008) results. PRO-T: 10 % productivity increase in services with technological 
substitution., EFF-T: 10 % efficiency reaise in services with technological substitution, QUA-T: 10 % quality improvement in services 
with technological substitution. PRO (a1): Armington s´ elasticity reduction between domestic and imported goods (50%). PRO (a2): 
Armington s´ elasticity reduction between domestic and imported goods (to zero), PRO (skl): Rise in demand of skilled labor plus 
reduction in demand of non skilled labor. *Note: Percentage changes refers to constant price variations, signs take initial calibration 
as reference (Superavit for Argentina, deficit for Uruguay and Brazil) 
For Brazil, we conducted an additional exercise assuming that skill and unskilled labor are not 
perfect substitutes, and that the new technology is more intensive in the former. The decreases in 
the levels of elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign services show no significant 
differences with respect to the base case of Productivity (PRO). The last exercise shows that a 
jump in the productivity of services differs if this industry employs a more intensive use of 
skilled labor. The post-liberalization demand for skilled labor declines due to improved 
productivity, which, in turn, causes the relative price of skilled labor to fall. The increment in the 
welfare level of households is maintained and GDP and Investment climb. As to its impact on the 
trade deficit, we see the same result obtained in Table 1, that is, practically zero. 
5.4 Reduction in the implicit mark-up (MUP) on imports of services. Competition of 
technologies. 
In this case we assume that the mark up is reduced due to competition. That is, the threat of trade 
in services disciplines domestic prices, and this is equivalent to a reduction in the implicit mark 
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up. For the overall results in general equilibrium, it becomes important to determine who was 
collecting the revenue that the mark up produced.  
So, we considered two sub cases, depending on who is assumed to be entitled to the proceedings 
of the mark up. In the first case, the richest decile of the economy receives the excess profits. In 
the second, it is the rest of the world who has the property right on the revenue. For Argentina 
and Uruguay, we assumed also that the reduction is due to the presence of a new technology, that 
uses internationally mobile capital. 
What are the plausible reductions in mark up due to liberalization in trade of services? We 
adopted the estimates given by Dee (2004, 2005) and Berlinski et al (2008). Reductions in 
Telecommunications included: Argentina 10% (1989-2005), Uruguay 5% (1997-2007); in Banks: 
Uruguay 14% (1997-2007), Brazil 2% (2004-2006).6  The results are reported in Table 5.  
 Table 3: Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay Computable General Equilibrium Model simulations. 
Results corresponding to Mark up reduction and technological substitution based on Dee (2005) 
methodology (%)  
Argentina Uruguay Brazil 
Indicators MUP-
T1 (T) 
MUP-
T2 (T) 
MUP-
T1 
(F&I) 
MUP-
T1 (T) 
MUP-
T2 
(F&I) 
MUP-
T2 (T) 
MUP 
(F&I) 
Real GDP 0.25 0.25 2.45 0.31 2.54 0.31 0.00 
Real Investment 0.10 0.12 1.28 0.22 1.61 0.24 0.00 
Trade* (Superavit) 0.68 0.52 - - - - - 
Trade* (Deficit) - - -11.27 -0.20 -7.50 -0.06 -0.55 
Activity level               
Agriculture 0.05 0.05 2.34 0.26 2.24 0.26 0.01 
Industry 0.16 0.15 2.51 0.28 2.41 0.28 0.02 
Services  0.00 0.00 0.55 0.05 0.66 0.06 -0.01 
TEL Sector  -2.43 -2.43 0.79 -2.99 0.75 -2.99 0.01 
F&I Sector  0.12 0.12 -2.65 0.04 -2.66 0.04 -0.06 
Home Welfare  - -  -  -  -  -  0.01 
Poorest Household  0.33 0.34 0.92 0.21 1.02 0.21 -  
Wealthiest Household  0.06 0.07 1.47 0.20 1.79 0.21 -  
Government Fiscal Situation - 0.14 1.00 0.14 1.06 0.15 0.00 
Source: Based on Chisari, Romero y Maquieyra (2008) results. Argentina: MUP-T1 (T): Markup received by the wealthiest 
home plus technological substitution (10%) for Telecommunications. MUP-T2 (T): Markup received by the rest of the world 
plus technological substitution (10%) for Telecommunications. Uruguay: MUP-T1 (F): Markup received by the wealthiest 
home plus technological substitution (14%) for Financial Services, MUP-T1 (T): Markup received by the wealthiest home 
plus technological substitution (5%) for Telecommunications, MUP-T2 (F): Markup received by the rest of the world with 
technological substitution (14%) for Financial Services, MUP-T2 (T): Markup received by the rest of the world plus 
technological substitution (5%) for Telecommunication. Brazil: MUP (F): Markup reductio of 2% (by the rest of the World) 
at Financial Services imports prices. *Note: Percentage changes refers to constant price variations, signs take initial 
calibration as reference (Superavit for Argentina, deficit for Uruguay and Brazil) 
 
For Argentina, as their estimate of “shadow prices” of constraints are not large, we do not see 
significant differences in our model. It was observed (not shown in the Table) that the activity 
                                               
6 Based on Berlinski, et al. (2008), Kume, et al. (2008) and Vaillant, et al. (2008). 
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level of the corresponding domestic service sector falls (and it is replaced with the production of 
the entrant). Previous simulations, showed more important effects under the assumption of more 
intense constraints on trade of services. Regarding the impact on the external sector, trade 
liberalization increases slightly total required surplus, since the trade balance must be 
compensated for dividends paid abroad. The qualitative results for Uruguay are quite similar. In 
the case of Brazil, there are not significant effects, and this is due again to the almost negligible 
level of the implicit mark-up attributed to the constraints (the country was already liberalized in 
trade of services at the time of the study, as it is maintained by Kume et al (2008)). 
5.5 Liberalization in trade of financial services (LIB) and regulations in Argentine 
portfolios  
The assumption in the case of liberalization of trade in financial services and insurance (LIB, 
Table 6) is that it is accompanied by entry of new operators that use mobile capital (between 
domestic activities and the rest of the world) and that are 10 percent more productive than those 
already installed. As was expected, the exercise shows an improvement in aggregate GDP, 
together with a higher rate of exports to cover the needs of the current account, which the positive 
change in the trade surplus (0.56 percent) confirms. 
Table 4: Argentina Financial Services liberalization 
and regulations (%) 
Indicators LIB LIB-P 
Real GDP 0.31 -0.67 
Real Investment 0.17 -1.75 
Trade (Superavit)  0.56 24.58 
Activity level   
Agriculture 0.06 0.27 
Industry 0.17 1.03 
Services   -0.17 -1,66 
TEL Sector   0.06 -0,36 
FyS Sector   -5.19 -4.95 
Domestic Welfare   
Poorest Household   0.46 -3,81 
Wealthiest Household   0.13 -1.44 
Government Fiscal Situation - -3.44 
LIB: More efficient new technology  (with a productivity 
increase of 10% in F&Y), LIB-P: More efficient new technology 
plus change of regulations on portfolio (new technology with a 
productivity increase of 10% in F&Y and a government bond 
price reduction of 5%). 
 
Liberalization of financial services to local operation of firms from the rest of the world, that 
purchase fewer government bonds (equivalent to a price reduction of them of 5 percent) is 
considered in the LIB-P exercise. That is, a significant entry of new operators requires a change 
in (or elimination of) regulations. Notice that in the case, all of the effects on welfare would 
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become negative. In some cases, the government’s reduced ability to finance its debt impinges 
upon the amount of transfers to the poor and affects others deciles, because it indirectly 
diminishes the activity level of the economy (recall we are assuming constant real wages). On top 
of that, the increase in the required trade surplus (24.6 percent) is notable; this is due to the need 
of increasing the level of exports to offset the reduction in purchase of bonds of the rest of the 
world. This could be considered a short run effect to be reversed in the future, but it can explain 
the reluctance of governments to liberalize financial services. 
6 MAIN LESSONS AND FINAL REMARKS 
We used two models to perform experiments in general equilibrium: the Rutherford´s GTAP 
version –Rutherford (2005)-  for Brazil, and a new version of the Argentine 2004 model based on 
Chisari et al. (2009) and adapted for the Uruguayan case. The latter uses the methodology 
developed in Rutherford (1995). Among the counterfactual exercises, we examined: 
improvements in efficiency, productivity and quality of services resulting from liberalization, 
modifications in competitive conditions due to threat of entry of competitors, different degrees of 
substitution between entrants´ and incumbents´ technologies, inconsistencies of factor 
endowments with those requested by new operators, and modifications in regulations and 
portfolio composition after the liberalization. We considered the simultaneous operation of 
incumbents´ and new adopted technologies, interpreting them as latent technologies, and 
observed how and to what extent the latter replaced the former. 
Overall, we drew the following lessons: 
1. There are significant gains in welfare as result of productivity, quality and efficiency (in that 
order) improvements in the services industries. Therefore, if the liberalization of trade is expected 
to increase competition and foster advances in productivity, quality or efficiency, there will be 
gains in a range of one to four percent of GDP, depending on country and scenario. 
2. The absolutely inclusive relevance of the improvements in quality is striking. If a service 
shows better quality following the opening, it could have an impact on the economy that is 
comparable to the habitually estimated gains in factors productivity of the services sectors. This 
effect is higher in the Argentine case than in the Uruguayan case.  
3. If the liberalization of trade in services is able to lower overpricing (derived from the domestic 
barriers to trade in services), our estimates that it is also reasonable to expect overall 
improvements in welfare. But if more liberalization of trade in services resulted in a higher 
concentration of domestic service industries (because of the presence of new operators that force 
exit of small competitive domestic firms) and overpricing were to rise, the net gains would turn 
negative yet again, even after taking into account gains in productivity and quality.  
4. The above mentioned findings are confirmed when we use the data on current barriers in 
Argentina and Uruguay; in Brazil, today’s degree of opening is quite close to the maximum if 
viewed from the perspective of overpricing and our simulations do not show potential residual 
gains. In Uruguay, however, we can see that a reduction in overpricing benefits the economy and 
the fiscal situation, even when it is the Uruguayan public owned enterprises that would have to 
sacrifice their price levels. 
  
19 
5. The results show that to reasonably expect gains from greater trade presence in these service 
industries there should be a balanced development between technology adoption and the 
endowment of domestic resources. Highly-intensive technology in some resources (like human 
capital) may generate net losses in welfare if the economy is not able to supply them. Likewise, 
the limited endowment of some factors could act as a constraint on gains from trade presence. 
6. When technologies compete, we observed that there is a limited and progressive phase down of 
incumbent operators, not a sudden replacement. The reason is that incumbents accommodate the  
more competitive market conditions through reductions in the reward of their non mobile, 
specific capital.  
7. The Argentine case illustrates that when the liberalization of financial services must 
necessarily be accompanied by a deregulation of portfolios, the governments themselves may 
oppose the reform in the short run because they would see the demand for their bonds drop. 
Hence, the gains in productivity, efficiency and quality may be limited by the loss of sources of 
financing.  
8. Our results also confirm what we see in the social accounting matrices: changes in the standard 
of living of the poor are highly correlated with the modification in economic and financial 
situation of governments. This is due to the fact that said matrices reflect the governments’ 
complex networks of transfers to the poorest deciles (this is clearly the case in Argentina and 
Uruguay). Therefore the short run financial position of governments could also explain the 
reluctance to adopt reforms. 
It is worth mentioning that we also conducted exercises on the reciprocal case: it is the rest of the 
world that lowers barriers to trade in services from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. We observed 
that there will be a price increase in domestic services so as to align with international prices, and 
this causes the domestic living standards to fall despite an increase of the scale of operation of 
domestic industries. However, that can be considered only a first round effect, and probably 
additional gains well be observed in a dynamic context.  
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A. APPENDIX: THE MODELS 
Two alternative models were used for simulation. On the one hand, a standard version of GTAP 
for Brazil; on the other, a special model developed by Chisari et al (2009) for Argentina, also 
adapted for Uruguay. Here we present a simplified version of the model used in the last case, including 
only four goods and only one household, though the complete version includes 29 industries and goods, 
and one representative household for each income decile. The corresponding sub indexes for goods and 
services are J = {1,2,N,R}. There are two industries that produce tradable goods, 1 and 2, one industry that 
produces non regulated services, N, and one sector of regulated services, R (regulation is limited here to 
price regulation) All production functions are CES, though value added and intermediate inputs are used 
in fixed proportions.  
A.1. Domestic household 
This agent collects also all taxes and grants subsidies. Net welfare of this household will therefore 
represent social welfare. The domestic agent maximizes the utility function  
1 2( , , , , , )N Ru c c c c m BD subject to: 
[1]
 
*
/
  ( *) ( , )
R
w
IT T R R N N m b I R R R
T I R
p c p c p c p m p BD BD wL r K tp G L K TR              
where   is the share of domestic agents in profits of the regulated sector *
R
 . The third term of the right-
hand side corresponds to the compensatory transfer from domestic customers ( t  0) or to the firm from 
its shareholders (t  0). Under public ownership,   = 1. In both cases, under price cap, t is computed so 
that pR = 1/(1+t). The last term corresponds to social transfers. To represent those programs of the 
government, every household is assumed to be endowed with a special good that is demanded by the 
public sector. The endowment is represented with TR* and v stands for its price.  Households also have  
and endowment of bonds BD*, to be purchased or sold according to their financial condition. Therefore, 
(BD-BD*)  is the net transaction at prices pB . 
From utility maximization, we obtain the familiar first order conditions: 
[2] ' '
Tc m T m
u u p p  
[3] ' 'R m R mu u p p  
[4] ' 'N m N mu u p p  
[5] ' 'N B N Bu u p p  
cT is consumption of domestic tradable goods, cR is the consumption of goods and services under 
regulation, m are imports (a good produced abroad but not domestically) and cN is consumption of rest of 
services. pT, pR, pN and pm are their respective prices. w is the wage rate and rI is  the rate of return on 
capital in each sector. L  and K represent the domestic agent endowments of labor and capital. 
The Armington assumption is used to represent imperfect substation between domestic and imported 
goods.  
The budget condition represents: (1) total expenses in goods, services and taxes; (2) income sources, 
mainly salaries, capital income and profits, as well as transfers (including pensions) received from the 
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government.  Investment goods enter also in the utility function (not shown in this version), for it is the 
household who determines total savings. 
A.2. Domestic Production Sectors 
Y, H and G are the production function of the tradable, non-tradable and regulated sectors, respectively. 
We assume constant returns to scales in all cases. This consents the separation of each industry in tour sub 
industries with a differentiated tax treatment (specially for VAT) according to destination, without altering 
the basic structure of the model.  
2.a Tradable sectors 
There is one firm that maximizes profits in each tradable sector. The net price for the firm is the price to 
consumers less the cost of intermediate inputs.  
[6]  , , , ( , )T T J T J R T R N T N T T T T T T
J T
p a p a p a p Y L K wL r K

      
  
  
for every T=1,2 and where aJT , aNT y aRT input coefficients 
Notice that firms observe the incentive given by the net price after intermediate inputs costs. The 
maximum profit conditions are: 
[7]  , , ,T J T J R T R N T N L
J T
p a p a p a p Y w

    
  
  
[8]  , , ,T J T J R T R N T N K T
J T
p a p a p a p Y r

    
  
  
In both cases, the value of marginal product (corrected for intermediate costs) is equalized to the reward of 
the factor. Notice that we are not assuming export or import taxes but they can be introduced easily as ad 
valorem taxes. 
2.b Non-tradable sector 
Services and other non tradable goods are produced using labor and capital. Capital is specialized and non 
mobile. Equation (9) corresponds to profits definition, and equations (10) and (11) to optimization 
conditions: 
[9] , ,(1 ) ( , )N N N T N T R N R N N N N N
T
t p a p a p H L K wL r K       
  
  
In this last expression we have included a sale tax to non tradable non regulated services. This is only for 
the sake of this simplified presentation, since the general model considers a wide range of different taxes 
(see Chisari et al (2009)). The maximization conditions are: 
[10]  , ,N T N T R N R L
T
p a p a p H w   
  
  
[11]  , ,N T N T R N R N N
T
p a p a p H r   
  
  
Our model considers the possibility of  price regulation in the two basic cases: price-cap and cost-plus. 
This is done introducing endogenous mark-ups (see Chisari et al (2009) and Chisari, Lambardi and 
Romero (2005)). 
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A.3. Rest of the world 
3.a Production sectors. 
The rest of the world produces substitutes for our exports and import goods, using a factor of production 
F. Equations (12) to (17) give an alternative technology available for foreign owners to fulfill their 
obligation of services, using mobile capital. 
[12]  * *( )
m m m m
p F w F    
[13]  * *( )
T T T T T
p F w F    
[14]  *mp w    
[15]  *T Tp w    
[16]  ( )s mm F  
[17]  ( )s T Tx F  
*
m and 
*
T  represent profits in the rest of the world industries that produce import goods and perfect 
substitutes of tradable goods. w*, the numeraire, is the wage rate of the only factor used abroad. Fm and FT 
are factor quantities employed in the corresponding industries. The production functions: α(Fm) and βT(FT) 
give the total supply in equations (15), <16> and <17>. In the case of α’ and T   constants, international 
terms of trade will be given by T m Tp p    (small economy assumption).  
3.b Households 
Consumers in the rest of the world receive the rents of foreign factors, including capital installed in 
Argentina. It maximizes a utility function *( , )Tv x m  that depends on the consumption of our tradable 
goods and of import goods, as well as the demand for bonds. Their budget condition is: 
[18]   * * * *( *) (1 ) ( , ) 1m T T R m T R R R
T
p m p x b BX BX w F tp G L K               
Foreign agent receives profits and capital return from domestic sectors, as well as the wage rate (cost of 
capital) F and the proceedings of the mark-up factor. XT are exports, that is domestic tradable goods 
bought by the foreign agent. The last term in equation (18) stands for the endogenous mark-up (positive) 
or internal subsidy (negative) computed as the difference between the benchmark tariff 1/ (as seen by 
customers) and PR. 
3.c Public sector 
The public sector is treated as a special agent. It collects tax revenues and  
 it, or buys goods and services (or factors, mainly Labor). It is endowed with a utility function UG, and 
therefore it is possible to estimate its welfare changes. It can also issue bonds. It also purchases investment 
goods.  
It initial endowment of bonds is BG* while (BG-BG*) stands for net purchases. Equation [18] gives the 
budget condition for the public sector: 
 [19] TR + LG +IG + G + pbBG= [tNpNH(LN,KN)] + pbBG* 
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Its utility function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas.  
A.4. Market equilibrium conditions 
Equations (20) to (22) represent the equilibrium conditions for factors used domestically, and (23) is the 
equilibrium condition for the foreign factor. Equations (24) to (27) correspond to equilibrium in markets 
for goods and imports. Equation (28) gives the market condition for the so called “market for transfers”. 
While (29) corresponds to the market for bonds. 
[20] 1 2 R NL L L L L LG      
[21]         ( 1, 2)T TK K T   
[22] N NK K   
[23] m T
T
F F F   
[24] , ,( , ) ( , ) ( , )R R R R T T T T R N N N R
T
G L K q a Y L K a H L K c     
[25] , ,( , ) ( , ) ( , )
s
T T T T T R R R T N N N T TY L K x a G L K a H L K c x      
[26] , ,( , ) ( , ) ( , )N N N T T T T N R R R N
T
H L K a Y L K a G L K c G IG      
[27] *sm m m   
[28] wTR TR  
[29] * * *BD BG BX BD BG BX      
 
A solution is a vector of prices of goods, services, factors, bonds and transfers that clear all markets 
simultaneously. Under unemployment, wages must be determined following some additional condition 
(like constant real wages). Under mobility, capital reward is the same across industries. 
 
